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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This is a permissive appeal arising from two interlocutory orders entered by the district
court during Erick Hall's pending capital post-conviction proceedings. This Court granted Mr.
Hall permission to appeal three issues: (1) whether the district court is justified in ordering a
second conflict inquiry where a conflict evaluation has already been conducted by an
independent attorney, who found no conflict, the Petitioner does not raise a conflict, and neither
the State nor the court can identify any facts that would give rise to a conflict; (2) whether the
district court violates the separation of powers by ordering the State Appellate Public Defender
(hereinafter SAPD) pay for services already provided under the statute designating the authority
to provide conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD; and (3) whether an attorney-client privilege
exists during the representation of a client, when communications pertain to a pending case on
which the client is being represented by other attorneys.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
During the course of Mr. Hall's post-conviction proceedings 1 the SAPD hired Dennis
Benjamin-an independent attorney-to evaluate a possible conflict it might have in its

1

It is undisputed that a jury found Erick Hall guilty of Murder in the First Degree and Rape, in
Ada County Case No. H0300624 (hereinafter "Hall II"). (R.38528/38704, pp.10, 54.) It is also
undisputed that after a special sentencing hearing pursuant to LC. § 19-2515, the judgment and
sentence of death were pronounced on January 3, 2008, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville,
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho. (R.38528/38704,
pp. l 0, 55.) On February 14, 2008, Mr. Hall filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief
pursuant to I.C. §19 1719, which initiated these capital post-conviction proceedings.
(R.38528/38704, p.9.) Mr. Hall also stands convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of
Lynn Henneman, Ada County Case No. H0300518, (hereinafter "Hall I.") (R.38528/38704,
pp.10 n. l, 11, 54.) It is undisputed by the parties that the SAPD represented Mr. Hall in the
"Hall I post-conviction proceedings during the time that Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal
represented the Petitioner in the present case, including during Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal's

representation of Mr. Hall. (Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (Filed Under Seal),
filed June 29, 20102 (hereinafter Ex Parte Notice).) Mr. Benjamin was contracted by the SAPD
to conduct a review and advise Mr. Hall on the matter. (Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin (Filed
Under Seal), filed August 30, 2010 3 (hereinafter Benjamin Affidavit),

ii 5.) Mr. Benjamin

obtained a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege from Mr. Hall with respect to the
SAPD, and had unfettered access to the SAPD's files and communications. (Benjamin Affidavit,
~ii

5, 8.) He conducted interviews with all of the parties involved and reviewed the relevant legal

pleadings. (Benjamin Affidavit,

ii 7.) Mr. Benjamin met with Mr. Hall and informed him of the

findings from his exhaustive investigation. (Benjamin Affidavit,

ii 5.) Mr. Benjamin determined

there was no conflict and informed the court of his evaluation and finding by affidavit.
(Benjamin Affidavit,

ii 10.)

The SAPD currently represents Mr. Hall on both Hall I and Hall II, on direct appeal and
in post-conviction proceedings. (R.38528/38704, p.11.) After the SAPD was appointed on Hall I
in January of 2005, Hall II had not yet gone to trial and Mr. Hall was represented by separate
counsel. During that period of overlapping representation, there were numerous communications
between Mr. Hall's attorneys at the SAPD and his trial attorneys.

Those communications

included meetings and discussions, as well as information-sharing regarding experts in
furtherance of their concurrent representation. (See R.38528/38704, p.1338.) These contacts
were the reason the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin to perform a conflict evaluation. Id Mr. Hall's
SAPD attorneys during the relevant time were Mark Ackley and Paula Swensen.
(R.38528/38704, p.1337.) Both of these attorneys had left their employment at the SAPD before

preparation for this case, the trial itself and the capital sentencing proceedings." (R.38528/38704,
p.1289; also see p.11.)
2
Appears as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. (See R.38528/38704, p.2043.)
3
Appears as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. (See R.38528/38704, p.2043.)
2

the

Parle Notice was filed. (2/3/2009 Tr.38528/38704, p.34, Ls.14-18 (Ms. Swensen left the

SAPD in July of 2008); R.38528/38704, p.1241 (Mr. Ackley left the SAPD in April of 2010).)
Mr. Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II were Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal. (R.38528/38704, p.10.)
After Mr. Hall was convicted and sentenced on Hall II, the SAPD was also appointed to
represent him on that case. (R.34890 Vol. VII, pp.1301 -02.)
When the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin to conduct a conflict evaluation, it notified the court
by way of its Ex Parte Notice that a conflict review was underway, and Mr. Benjamin had been
hired to handle it. (Et Parte Notice, p.3.) A month later, without any knowledge of the E,x Parte
Notice, the State filed a separate motion requesting a judicial inquiry into any possible conflict
that may exist. (R.38528/38704, pp.1288-90.) The Court granted that motion for inquiry before
ever hearing from Mr. Benjamin as to his findings and assessment. (8/26/2010 Tr.38528/38704,
p.295, Ls.1-3.) The district court noted that hearing from Mr. Benjamin would not be helpful
until the court had decided whether a conflict existed. (Id, p.297, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Benjamin
subsequently filed his affidavit detailing his investigation and conclusion that there was no
conflict. (Benjamin Affidavit.)
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel
After reviewing Mr. Benjamin's affidavit, the district court issued its Memorandum
Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel (hereinafter
Order). (R.38528/38704, pp.1368-78.) In its Order, the district court admitted it was "presently

lacking the factual background necessary" to reach its own conclusion as to whether a conflict
actually existed. Id at 1374. Instead, the Order appointed a second attorney to evaluate whether
a conflict existed and to advise the court on the matter. The district court's order held that no
privilege existed between the SAPD and Mr. Hall during the relevant period regarding Hall II.

3

Id. at 1375. At the same time, the district court acknowledged there was a privilege between the
SAPD and Mr. Hall with regard to information or communications concerning Hall I. Id.
The court ordered any attorney-client privilege between Mr. Roark and Mr. Hall waived
to the extent necessary for Mr. Roark to report to the Court "(1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if
so, the general nature of the conflict; (3) the facts surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4)
whether independent counsel believes that such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's
office."

Id. at 1376.

Finally, although the SAPD had already paid for Mr. Benjamin's

representation of Mr. Hall, the Court ordered the SAPD to also pay for Mr. Roark' s work. Id. at
1377.
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the
Original Decision and Order
After Mr. Hall filed a Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order
(R.38528/38704, pp.1379-414), the district court issued its Afemorandum Decision and Order
Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order

(hereinafter, Supplemental Order) on February 23, 2011. (R.38528/38704, pp.1965-74.) In the
Supplemental Order, the district court clarified certain aspects of its original order.

The

Supplemental Order authorized Mr. Roark to view the files of the SAPD even in the absence of a

waiver from Mr. Hall. (R.38528/38704, p.1969). In addition, the district court ordered that all
employees and attorneys at the SAPD be ordered to cooperate with Mr. Roark during the course
of his investigation, regardless of any attorney-client privilege or rule of confidentiality that may
exist, because Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct (hereinafter IRPC) 1.6(b)( 6) allows counsel to
breach protections in order to comply with a court order. (R.38528/3 8704, pp.1969-70.)

4

JS SUES
Whether The District Court Was Justified In Ordering A Second Conflict Inquiry Where
A Conflict Evaluation Had Already Been Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who
Found No Conflict, The Petitioner Did Not Raise A Conflict, And Neither The State Nor
The Court Can Identify Any Specific Facts That Would Either Undermine Those
Determinations Or Give Rise To A Conflict?
2.

Whether The District Court Violated The Separation Of Powers By Ordering The SAPD
To Pay For Services Already Provided Under The Statute Designating The Authority To
Provide Conflict Counsel Specifically To The SAPD Where There ls No Evidence The
SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their Obligations?

3.

Whether The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of Confidential And
Attorney Client Privileged Information In Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict
Inquiry?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Ordering A Second Conflict Inquiry Where A Conflict Evaluation
Had Already Been Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who Found No Conflict, The
Petitioner Did Not Raise a Conflict, And Neither The State Nor The Court Can Identify Any
Facts That Would Either Undermine Those Determinations Or Give Rise To A Conflict
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hall has both a constitutional and statutory right to conflict-free counsel on direct

appeal and in his initial post-conviction in a capital case. Mr. Benjamin has determined, and
represented to the court, there is neither an actual conflict nor reason to believe a conflict exists.
Jn this instance, the SAPD's Ex Parle Notice is supplanted by Mr. Benjamin's affidavit. In that
affidavit, Mr. Benjamin found no actual conflict arose from the contacts which led the SAPD to
file its original Ex Parle Notice.

In addition, in an abundance of caution, Mr. Benjamin

explained no conflict that could possibly exist would be of a nature requiring the conflict to be
imputed to other SAPD attorneys.

Under these circumstances, the district court has no basis to

order a second conflict inquiry by Mr. Roark.
B.

Right To Conflict-Free Counsel Where Actual Conflicts Exist
Even though in the present case Mr. Benjamin's independent evaluation revealed that no

actual conflict exists, the district court's duty to inquire is rooted in a defendant's right to
conflict-free counsel. A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment and Due Process right to
conflict-free representation at trial and on appeal. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703
(2009) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)), also see Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963), Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).

Idaho appellate courts have also

recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel for non-frivolous claims, as opposed to a
constitutionally grounded right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004); Plant v. State,

6

143 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2006); see also J.C.§ 19-852(b); LC.§ 19-4904. However, even
in the absence of a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts have
still acknowledged a petitioner's constitutional right to post-conviction representation unmarred
by conflict. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90 (2000) ("Because these facts do not
identify a conflict other than the one related to the trial, they also fail to support the claim of
ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction counsel as a result of a conflict of interest.").
Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has recognized, a statutory constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009), the Supreme Court considered
whether a criminal defendant had a protected right to the effective assistance of counsel at
Violent Sexual Predator (VSP) hearing board determination and on appeal from that decision.
Like post-conviction cases, because the hearing and appeal were "civil in nature, there is no
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 833. However, because the right to
counsel was provided by statute, the Supreme Court found a statutory right to effective
0

assistance of counsel. 4 Id.

The Court concluded that because "there is a statutory right to

effective assistance of counsel" the "appropriate analysis is by reference to the well-established
standards governing such claims under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 834. Here, the same
extension of a Sixth Amendment analysis of conflict-free counsel should apply regardless of
whether the guarantee of counsel is by statute or by a constitutional right.

4

"This statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the
right to effective assistance of counsel." Smith v. State, 146 Idaho at 833 (quoting Hernandez v.
State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995)). Consequently, the Court found there was no "legitimate
basis" to evaluate an effective assistance of counsel claim any differently based on whether the
right to counsel was guaranteed by statute or by the constitution. Id. at 833-34. It should also be
noted that because the SAPD acts concurrently as both appellate and post-conviction counsel, it
would be almost impossible to divide the SAPD' s representation at any point in time as
constitutionally required (as on direct appeal), or statutorily mandated (during initial postconviction).
7

The critical issue in identifying whether a conflict of interest exists lies in determining if
the interests of counsel conflict with his or her client's interest, thereby compromising counsel's
duty of loyalty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel
who labors under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client,
which is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). The United States Supreme Court has
drawn a distinction between actual and theoretical conflicts of interest, finding that '"an actual
conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed
to a mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v.
(2002)(emphasis in original).

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171

That Court held "an 'actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment

purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance." Id. at 172 n.5.
This Court has stated an actual conflict of interest involves counsel actively representing
conflicting interests. See Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62 (2004) (citing State v. Wood, 132
Idaho 88, 98 (1998)). As summarized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
In several cases in which the Supreme Court has defined the right to conflict-free
counsel, the defense attorney actively and concurrently represented conflicting
interests. In those cases, the Court created, in effect, a distinction between an
actual conflict of interest, and a mere hypothetical one . . . . [T]he Sixth
Amendment does not protect against a "mere theoretical division of loyalties."
Rather, it protects against conflicts of interest that adversely affect counsel's
performance. Indeed, in Mickens, the Court held that "actual conflict" is defined
by the effect a potential conflict had on counsels performance. In Mickens, the
Court explained, "[AJn actual conflict of interest [means] precisely a conflict that
affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of
loyalties."

Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1991) ("More than a mere possibility of a conflict,
however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only when the representation of
counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest."). Accordingly, while a trial court
has a duty to inquire into a potential conflict of interest, "a trial court may not disqualify counsel

8

on the basis of speculation or conjecture .... " People ex rel. Woodard v. Dist. Ct., 704 P.2d 851,
853 (Col. 1985). In the instant case, the district court has effectively disqualified Mr. Benjamin
as Mr. Hall's counsel for the limited issue of advising him on any potential conflict and replaced
him with Mr. Roark, based on the district court's speculation and conjecture that Mr. Benjamin's
evaluation, advice and counsel are not impartial.
The appropriate appellate standard of review in this case is the same as would apply
when constitutional issues are presented. "The adequacy of the inquiry into a conflict of interest
is a constitutional issue over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Statton, 136
Idaho 135, 136, 30 P.3d 290, 291 (2001)." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259 (Ct. App. 2003).
C.

The Extent Of District Court's Duty To Inquire Based On Easing Defendant's Concern
Mr. Hall acknowledges the "trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential

conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist."'
State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, 703 (2009) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)
(emphasis added)). Because the possibility of a conflict was raised by Mr. Hall's counsel alone,
and not by Mr. Hall, each of the conflict cases argued before the district court below present
facts significantly different from those presented here.
The case of State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694 (2009), presents an extensive discussion of
the court's obligation to conduct a "thorough and searching" conflict examination. Id. at 704.
However, in that case, Mr. Severson had been appointed counsel at trial "despite Severson's
objection that he had a conflict of interest" and had argued himself that "the appointment of
[counsel] violated his right to be represented by conflict-free counsel." Id. at 701. This Court
made clear that "because Severson had objected to the conflict of interest at trial, the court had
an affirmative duty to inquire into the potential conflict." Id. at 704 (emphasis added). In light
of that crucial fact, this Court indicates the trial court "must make the kind of inquiry that might
9

ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern." Id. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923
F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)). Here, Mr. Hall has not made an objection,
requested different counsel, or shown any dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern about his
representation by the SAPD after being fully advised on the issue by an independent attorney. 5
In Severson, this Court also relied on State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003).

In

Lovelace, the prosecution first moved that defense counsel be disqualified because of a conflict
with his ongoing campaign to seek the position of county prosecutor. Id. at 59. Lovelace later
filed a motion to dismiss his trial counsel "due to a possible future conflict of interest" and
requested he be allowed to proceed pro se. Id.

Although the court refused to appoint new

counsel at that time, a new lawyer was appointed once his original attorney was sworn in as
county prosecutor. Id. In Lovelace, this Court noted "whenever a trial court knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." Id. at 60
(emphasis added).

This Court found, "Lovelace provided no facts to suggest that counsel

allowed anything adversely to affect his representation", concluding "the district court's denial
of relief on the conflict of interest claim was proper." Id at 61-62.

This Court's findings

acknowledged the district court and the State were aware of circumstances that could appear to
present a conflict, but there had been no suggestion that the attorney's representation was
compromised. In light of Mr. Benjamin's affidavit, the same rationale applies in the instant case.
Mr. Benjamin acknowledged contacts between SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, but neither the
State nor the district court identify facts to suggest the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall has

5

In its holding, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to find that a conflict existed where another
public defender who worked in the same office as Mr. Severson' s trial counsel, had represented
the mother of the victim in a civil suit directly relating to Mr. Severson's criminal case. Id. at
701. The facts presented in Mr. Benjamin's affidavit do not reveal any type of personal interest
that would be comparable to the facts in Severson. (See Benjamin Affidavit, ifil 6, 10, 11, 12.)
10

been affected by those prior contacts. Unlike Lovelace, Mr. Hall has never made a request for
new counsel, and the district court admitted "this Court is presently lacking the factual
background necessary to make such a determination." (R.38528/38704, p.1970.)
Finally, the parties also cited State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003), where the
Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant deserved a new trial after the trial court had
undertaken to appoint conflict counsel to advise the defendant about the effects of an actual
conflict known by the court, and the defendant had subsequently waived any conflict. The Court

of Appeals found "the inquiry into the potential conflict was adequate" and reversed the trial
court's decision to grant the defendant a new trial based on the conflict. Id. at 259. In the instant
case, where no actual conflict has been found, Mr. Hall was still afforded the advice of an
independent attorney and has decided not to raise any conflict issues.
D.

A Second Inquiry Is Unnecessary And Duplicative
The district court found the SAPD's filings disclosed that: (1) SAPD attorneys had

contact with trial counsel in Hall II that may present a conflict of interest; (2) SAPD attorneys
were concerned about a possible conflict of interest; (3) the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin to
independently evaluate the conflict; and, (4) Mr. Benjamin was hired to evaluate the conflict and
advise Mr. Hall as to any waiver. (R.38528/38704, p.1966.) In addition, the district court found
Mr. Benjamin's inquiry "revealed at least one instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial
counsel in Hall II." Id at 1967.
When attorneys at the SAPD identified involvement between its own pnor postconviction attorneys and trial counsel on Hall II, the SAPD decided, out of an abundance of
caution, to contract with independent counsel for the purpose of determining if a conflict existed.
(8/26/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.306, Ls.23-25; Benjamin Affidavit,

11

if 5.) At the same time, it

informed the district court it had contracted with Mr. Benjamin to represent Mr. Hall on the
matter. (Er Parte Notice, p.3.) Because the SAPD recognized that any evaluation of the nature
and quality of the conflict made by its own attorneys could be perceived as compromised, the
SAPD contracted with independent counsel to evaluate the communications and independently
advise Mr. Hall of the potential conflict and any rights he might have as a result. (8/6/2010
Tr.38528/38704, p.259, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Benjamin was contracted by the SAPD as "counsel to
Mr. Hall" and not as counsel for the SAPD. (8/26/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.307, Ls.2-4;
Benjamin Affidavit,

~

5.) After Mr. Hall signed a waiver, the SAPD gave Mr. Benjamin full

access to attorney and client files in Hall I and Hall II, and all communications with Hall II trial
counsel. (8/26/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.307, Ls.4-5; Benjamin Affidavit,

~iJ

5, 7.) Other than

providing access to Mr. Benjamin, there was no farther communication with Mr. Benjamin
regarding his findings or advice to Mr. Hall prior to his submitting his affidavit (See 8/26/2010
Tr.38528/38704, p.283, Ls.16-18; Benjamin Affidavit, if5.)

Mr. Benjamin undertook an

exhaustive investigation of the period of overlapping representation, and met with Mr. Hall.
(Benjamin Affidavit,~~ 5, 7.) Mr. Benjamin appeared in court three times to represent Mr. Hall
before the district court on the conflict issue. (8/26/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.282, L.24; 9/1/2010
Tr.38528/38704, p.335, Ls.17-19; 10/19/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.348, Ls.17-18.)
Mr. Benjamin explained in his affidavit that although there was contact between SAPD
}m;vyers and Hall II trial counsel, those contacts did not constitute a conflict under Idaho law.
(Benjamin Affidavit,

fl

10.) Mr. Benjamin recognized in one instance SAPD la\\]ers did offer

advice to Mr. Hall's attorneys, but the advice given presented no conflict for the SAPD. Id.,

~

12. After his review and evaluation, Mr. Benjamin met with Mr. Hall and consulted with him.

Id, fl 5. Mr. Hall has never directly, or indirectly through Mr. Benjamin, expressed any concern
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regarding a potential conflict with the SAPD. In spite of the extensive inquiry, the district court
found in its Supplemental Order these very actions undertaken by the SAPD established a basis
for a secondjudicial inquiry by Mr. Roark. (See R.38528/38704, p.1970.)
1. The Weight And Import Of Representations Made By Dennis Benjamin

Trial courts "necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of
defense counsel" in determining whether a conflict of interest exists or will likely develop in the
course of their representation. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (citing Holloway v.

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 4 75, 482 (1978)).

Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, have held trial counsel's judgment that no conflict of interest exists is a sufficient basis
for a court to conclude there is no conflict. United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006,
1012 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1987).
The IRPC also suggest that "determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily
the responsibility of the lawyer involved." IRPC Rule 3.7, Comment

ir

6. The same rules also

make it clear that an attorney's failure to faithfully comply with those established standards
provide grounds for discipline. See IRPC Preamble if 19. The United States Supreme Court has
noted "when a considered representation regarding a conflict in clients' interests comes from an
officer of the court, it should be given the weight commensurate with the grave penalties risked
for misrepresentation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978).
The preference for the defendant's or petitioner's own counsel to make the determination
as to the existence and effect of a conflict, independent of judicial inquiry, is important due to the
very nature of the attorney-client privilege, and the fact the SAPD actively represented Mr. Hall
as appellate counsel in Hall I at the time he was on trial in the instant case (Hall JI). (See infra.
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III(B).) Mr. Benjamin assessed the possible conflict of interest issue and concluded no conflict
existed. This opinion was reached after interviewing Mr. Hall's former SAPD, trial counsel,
Mr. Hall, reviewing SAPD files (including notes, and correspondence), Mr. Hall's postconviction petitions in Hall I and Hall II, in light of relevant case law, the IRPC, and a recent
article by Bar Counsel. (Benjamin Affidavit,

if 7.)

A second conflict inquiry conducted by Mr. Roark would be entirely duplicative of the
review and work already completed by Mr. Benjamin. There is no evidence Mr. Roark will do
anything differently than what Mr. Benjamin has already done. Additionally, to the extent the
district court was dissatisfied with the information provided by Mr. Benjamin, it did not exhaust
that resource, and in fact, refused to inquire at all of Mr. Benjamin beyond the content of his
affidavit. (See 812612010 Tr.38528/38704, pp.276-333; 9/1/2010 Tr.38528/38704, pp.334-46;
1011912010 Tr.38528/38704, pp.347-78. 6)

To the extent Mr. Benjamin did not conduct

depositions, the district court could also grant him that power. (See 10/19/2010 Tr.38528/38704,
p.3 71, L.19 - p.372, L.4.)
2. Imputing Conflicts Of Former Public Defenders To Public Defenders At Same Office
Regardless of the district court's willingness to accept Mr. Benjamin's representations
about the existence of any conflict between Mr. Hall and the SAPD, a second inquiry is also
unnecessary precisely because any possible conflict created by actions taken by Ms. Swensen or

6

Mr. Benjamin only addressed the court briefly on 10119/2010 at p.371, L.13 -p.374, L.4, and
offered an explanation as to why he did not feel depositions were necessary, and explained why
the State's concern regarding a former attorney from the SAPD becoming a witness in postconviction did not present a problem under these facts. (The official transcript also notes
Mr. Benjamin speaking at p.369 of the transcript, through p.3 71. However, during that speech
the speaker refers to Mr. Benjamin in the third person, refers to "Mr. Ackley or Ms. Swensen or
other people from our office', and is followed by Mr. Benjamin. All of that would lead one to
believe that the speaker on pp.369-71 is misattributed to Mr. Benjamin, and appears to be
Mr. Thomson from the SAPD.)
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Mr. Ackley should not be imputed to Mr. Hall's current post-conviction counsel at the SAPD.
Neither Ms. Swensen nor Mr. Ackley, post-conviction counsel for Mr. Hall at the time of the
Hall II trial, were working for the SAPD at the time either the Ex Parte Notice or the State's
original Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) were filed. (2/3/2009
Tr.38528/3 8704, p.34, Ls.14-18; R.3 8528/3 8704, p.1241.)
The Court of Appeals has held that even where one attorney currently employed by the
same public defender office labors under a conflict, that conflict will not necessarily be imputed
to all other attorneys in the same office. State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 794 (Ct. App. 2007). The
primary holding in Cook was ultimately adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009). In Cook, the Cowt of Appeals reviewed a case where one
public defender at the Kootenai Public Defender was representing a defendant at trial and
another attorney in the same ofiice "had recently represented or was currently representing
numerous of the state's witnesses in Cook's case." Cook, 144 Idaho at 787. Although the facts
in the instant case do not involve concurrent representation of multiple defendants or witnesses
in a case involving Mr. Hall, the fact that such a facially apparent conflict did not lead the Court
of Appeals to impute the conflict to other attorneys at the Kootenai Public Defender's Office,
leads one to believe such a conflict would not be imputed to current attorneys for representation
made by former attorneys at the same office.
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that "a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to
affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the conflict would
hamper an attorney's ability to effectively represent a client." Id. at 794. Neither the district
court nor the State can explain how the contact between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen would
hamper Mr. Hall's current attorneys' ability to effectively represent him.
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In his affidavit to the court, Mr. Benjamin specifically recognizes the impact of Severson
on his evaluation of any possible conflict of interest and finding there is no conflict, unjustified
or otherwise. (Benjamin Affidavit,

ifif 7, 8, 13.) In the present case, neither the State nor the

court can show that any actions taken by Mr. Ackley or Ms. Swensen represent an actual
conflict, or might substantially affect or compromise the SAPD' s current representation of
Mr. Hall.
E.

Conclusion
Mr. Benjamin performed a careful and exhaustive evaluation of any possible conflicts of

interest the SAPD may have had with Mr. Hall. The district court's order appointing Keith
Roark, in large part, mimicked the work that had already been performed by Mr. Benjamin.
Since any work done by Mr. Roark would be duplicative, this Court should vacate the district
court's order appointing Mr. Roark to engage in a second conflict review. If the district court
were still not satisfied with the adequacy of the conflict evaluation done by Mr. Benjamin, it
would be free to inquire further of Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Hall and seek additional information or
assurances from them.

II.

The District Court Exceeded Its Authority And Violated The Separation Of Powers By Ordering
the SAPD To Pay For Services Already Provided Under the Statute Designating The Authority
To Provide Conflict Counsel Specifically To The SAPD, Where There Is No Evidence The
SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their Obligations
A.

Introduction
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-871, the SAPD has the statutory obligation to represent capital

clients in post-conviction, and to pay the costs incurred as part of that representation in the event
the SAPD is unable to carry out its duties due to a conflict or other reasons. The SAPD satisfied
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that statutory obligation by contracting with Mr. Benjamin to evaluate the possibility of a
conflict of interest, to advise Mr. Hall on the matter, and to afford him an opportunity to further
raise the issue with the district court. The SAPD identified a circumstance where it believed the
client would best be served by independent advice from independent counsel. Relying on the
same process and procedure it employs daily in satisfying its statutory obligation, it contracted
with an attorney to perform that work and paid for those services out of its own budget The
district court's subsequent order appointing a second attorney to conduct yet another conflict
evaluation at the SAPD's expense, and to repeat the work already performed by Mr. Benjamin,
violates the principle of the separation of powers and exceeds the court's authority.
Whether a branch of government exercises powers that properly belong to another branch
is a constitutional question. IDAHO CONST., art. II, § l; Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 276
(Ct. App. 2005).

"Because constitutional questions are purely questions of law, they are

reviewed de novo." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001).
B.

The District Court's Order Violates The Separation Of Powers And Exceeds Its Authority
The Idaho Legislature has authorized the SAPD, by statute, to identify and evaluate

conflicts, and to provide conflict attorneys in the appropriate cases. In this case, the SAPD has
fulfilled that obligation by hiring Mr. Benjamin to represent Mr. Hall and advise him of his rights
and options. At issue is whether a district court judge has the authority to order the SAPD to pay
for services the SAPD has already contracted to be performed and paid for-pursuant to its
statutory obligation.
I. Principle Of Separation Of Powers
When the Legislature created the office of the State Appellate Public Defender, it
categorized the office as a department of self-governing agencies within the executive branch,
with the SAPD being appointed by the Governor, on the advice and consent of the Senate. I.C.
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§§ 19-869(1)-(2), 67-2601(1). The legislature also identified the powers and duties of the SAPD
and his or her office to include the representation of indigent capital defendants in postconviction relief proceedings, in the district court and on direct appeal. See LC. § 19-870(1 )(a),
(d). In addition to these duties, the Legislature vested the SAPD with the power to "contract
with private attorneys to provide representation on a case-by-case basis when such contracts
would conserve budgetary resources." LC. § 19-870(3). Furthermore, the SAPD was directed to
"arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state
appellate public defender" in circumstances where the SAPD is "unable to carry out the duties
required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason[.]"

LC.§ 19-871.

Pursuant to these provisions, it is the exclusive power of the SAPD to decide who it will contract
with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do so.
The questions asked directly involve the separation of powers laid forth in the Idaho
Constitution. See IDAHO CONST., art. II, § 1 ("no person ... charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these department shall exercise any powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."). "The powers
of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative,
executive and judicial[.]" Estep v. Commissioners of Boundary County, 122 Idaho 345, 346
(1992). "[Article 2, § 1] delineates the doctrine of separation of powers as it relates to the
coordinate branches of government-where a power is given to department, another department
cannot act." Id. (citing State ex rel. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775 (1937)).
The district court orders in question represent unauthorized judicial oversight of the
executive branch. "In the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionally protected rights,
the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislature's exclusive policy
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decisions." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255 (1995) (quoting Idaho State AFL-

CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 698 (1986)). This Court "has consistently recognized that the
separation of powers provided by Article II of our constitution prohibits judicial review of the
discretionary acts of other branches of government." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at
261.
2. The SAPD Has Satisfied Its Statutory Obligation And Should Not Be Responsible To
Pay For Additional Representation
The district court ordered the SAPD to pay for counsel of the court's choosing to
represent Mr. Hall in a conflict inquiry. Despite being informed by the SAPD that an inquiry
had already been done, and the SAPD had no budgetary resources to pay for second counsel
appointed by the court, the district court disregarded the information and ordered the SAPD to
pay for second counsel to represent Mr. Hall in a conflict inquiry. (R.38528/38704, pp.1457,
1972.) In so doing, the district court has effectively defeated the Legislature's intent in creating
the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund, and has exceeded its jurisdiction.
In March of 1998, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, which
sets forth the qualifications for appointed counsel in capital cases. That same year, the Idaho
Legislature created the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD.

See Hon. George R.

Reinhardt III, Recent Developments in the Law Applicable to Capital Cases and Criminal

Appeals by Indigents, 42 Advocate 7 (June 1999); I.C. § 19-869(1). The Legislature codified its
intent in creating both the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD. With respect to the capital
crimes defense fund:
The establishment of a capital crimes defense fund by the counties of the state
for the purpose of funding the costs of criminal defense in cases where the
penalty of death is a legal possibility is hereby authorized .... Membership in
the fund shall be voluntary, as determined by resolution of the board of county
commissioners of the respective counties of the state.
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The services of the state appellate public defender as provided in section 19870, Idaho Code, shall be available only to those counties participating in the
fund.
LC. § l 9-863A(l ), (5). Similarly, with respect to the SAPD:
The legislature recognizes that the cost of legal representation of indigent
defendants upon the appeal of their criminal convictions, particularly
convictions for first-degree murder, is an extraordinary burden on the counties
of this state. In order to reduce this burden, provide competent counsel but
avoid paying high hourly rates to independent counsel to represent indigent
defendants in appellate proceedings, the legislature hereby creates the office of
the state appellate public defender.
LC. § 19-868. These same acts also had the effect of consolidating appellate and post-conviction
indigent defense representation in a single office of the SAPD.
When the legislature created the SAPD office, it categorized the office as a department of
self-governing agencies within the executive branch, with the State Appellate Public Defender
being appointed by the Governor, on the advice and consent of the Senate. I.C. § 19-869(1 ), (2).
The Legislature also identified the powers and duties of the SAPD and his or her office,
including, but not limited to, the representation of indigent capital defendants in post-conviction
relief proceedings in the district court, and on direct appeal. See I.C. § l 9-870(a), (d). The
Legislature vested the SAPD with the power to "contract with private attorneys to provide
representation on a case-by-case basis when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources,"
LC. § 19-870(3), and to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of
the budget of the state appellate public defender" in circumstances where the SAPD is "unable to
carry out the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason."
LC.§ 19-871.
Pursuant to these provisions, it is within the power of the SAPD to decide who it will
contract with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do
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so. The SAPD's power and ability to contract with outside counsel is dependent on having
sufficient funds to so contract. (See R.38528/38704, pp.1456-57 (Affidavit of Josh Tewalt,

~
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("That all state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any contract is subject to
sufficient appropriation from the Legislature[.]");
the

SAPD

would

not

have

the

guarantee

~

20 ("That any contract currently initiated by
of sufficient

Legislative

General

Fund

Appropriations.").) The SAPD's budget is wholly dependent upon an annual appropriation of
funding from the Idaho State Legislature. See IDAHO CONST., art. VII, § 13 ("No money shall be
drawn from the treasurer, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law."). "An appropriation
in this state is authority of the Legislature given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper
officers to apply a specified sum from a designated fund out of the treasury for a specified object
or demand against the state." Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102 (1922).
The district court was advised the SAPD had no funds in its budget to pay for additional
counsel, an assertion supported by the affidavit of Joshua Tewalt from the Idaho Division of
Financial Management (DFM). (R.38528/38704, p.1457,

ii 21

(the SAPD has "no money in the

FY201 l budget to cover an additional contract for conflict services in Erick Hall v. State of

Idaho").) Consequently, the DFM recommended against the SAPD entering any additional
contracts in fiscal year 2012. 7 (R.38528/38704, p.1457, ii~ 23, 26, 27.) To order the SAPD to
engage in a second contract to provide services to Mr. Hall (which had already been rendered), in
light of the State's fiscal situation, was an overreach by the district court.

7

The SAPD had already been denied a capital case supplemental appropnat10n, and had
submitted a separate supplemental appropriation for already existing shortfalls. (R.38528/38704,
p.1456, ~·r 12, 15.) In addition, the 2012 budget recommended $0.00 for capital outlay, and any
additional conflict contracts would not be guaranteed. (R.38528/38704, p.1457, ~~ 20, 26.)
21

The district court erroneously relied upon Idaho Code § 19-871 for its authority to order
the SAPD to compensate "independent counsel'' from the SAPD budget

(R.38528/38704,

p.1377.) Specifically, because no conflict has been identified in Mr. Hall's case, and because
Mr. Roark is an attorney appointed by the district court to conduct its own inquiry and report to
the district court regarding whether a conflict exists, Idaho Code § 19-871 does not require the
SAPD to pay for Mr. Roark's service to the district court. When the SAPD incurs a cost, it does
so pursuant to contractual agreements between the SAPD and the conflict attorney. No such
arrangement or contract exists between the SAPD and Mr. Roark. As a result of the absence of
an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the district court's order, the court's order is in excess
of its jurisdiction and is an attempt to defeat the legislative intent in creating both the SAPD
office and the capital crimes defense fund.

cf Jn re: State v. District Court of the Fourth

Judicial District, 143 Idaho 695, 152 P.3d 566 (2007) (the State was required to pay costs/fees of

special master appointed by the district court in her discretion, where Idaho Code § 12-118
provides that when the State is a party and costs are awarded against it, a warrant must be drawn
against the general funds to pay such costs, but the district court cannot identify the source of
funding for such costs and cannot issue a writ of execution for the payment to ensure such
payment.).
In this case, the district court has selected an attorney other than the public defender, and
m defining the scope of representation, determined "the direct expenses necessary to
representation." See I.C. § 19-860(b). Thus, pursuant to I.C. § 19-860(b) even assuming the
district court could order the appointment of Mr. Roark, Ada County is responsible for the
payment of Mr. Roark' s services. Absent a showing the SAPD cannot carry out its statutory
mandate, the SAPD has no obligation to pay for alternate counsel. Here, the SAPD has already
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provided Mr. Hall with the service which the SAPD believed, in an abundance of caution, they
could better provide him through an independent attorney-an impartial and honest assessment
of the existence of a conflict.
3. Acting Within Its Duty And Obligation, The SAPD Appropriately Selected And
Provided Conflict Counsel
The ethical and professional duties set forth in the IRPC require a two-step analysis when
addressing conflicts: first, determine whether a concurrent conflict exists, 8 and then, if so, decide
whether notwithstanding the conflict, the lawyer may continue to represent the client. See IRPC
1.7(a), (b). The commentary to the Rule requires attorneys to spend considerable energy and
effort in identifying possible conflicts suggesting that "to determine whether a conflict of interest
exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures." IRPC 1.7, Comment

~

3. The SAPD

adopted a "reasonable procedure" in notifying the court, ex parte, of its intent to contract with
Mr. Benjamin to represent Mr. Hall in order to evaluate whether a conflict exists, and to advise
Mr. Hall on any waiver of that conflict. The result of that evaluation is represented by the
finding in Mr. Benjamin's affidavit to the court.
The Legislature requires the SAPD to select and compensate conflict counsel in such
cases. Idaho Code § 19-871 provides as follows: "Should the state appellate public defender be
unable to carry out the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other
reason, the state appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to
be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender." (emphasis added).
Here, the SAPD identified a situation in which it believed there could potentially be a conflict of
interest. The process used by the SAPD in selecting Mr. Dennis Benjamin was the exact process
8

The SAPD recognized from the beginning that any potential conflict of interest would include
more than actual conflicts where there is "direct adverseness," and would include the "material
limitation" conflict of interest as explained in IRPC 1.7, Comment ~ 8. (See R.38528/38704,
p.1299, n.1.)
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used by the SAPD in selecting counsel for appellate cases originally assigned to the SAPD for
direct appeal or post-conviction representation where a conflict is identified, or the SAPD is
otherwise unable to carry out its duties. (8/6/2010 Tr.38528/38704, p.258, L.24 - p.259, L.4.)
Consequently, the SAPD satisfied its statutory obligation arranging for counsel, and assuming
full financial responsibility for such an assignment.
Nevertheless, on multiple occasions the district court expressed dissatisfaction with the
SAPD's selection of Mr. Benjamin and questioned his independence. (8/6/2010 Tr.38528/38704,
p.257, Ls.8-11 ("he is not the Court's selection in this case and so, therefore, your view that he's
independent is nice, but it's not necessarily persuasive to me"); R.38528/38704, p.1377
("Mr. Benjamin was chosen by the same office that is potentially conflicted in this matter. ... He
is closely aligned with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and
therefore, a portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that
office."); R.38528/38704, p.1971 ("Mr. Benjamin is the SAPD's choice of conflict counsel,
taking the place of the SAPD as to the conflict issue alone. This Court, at this stage of the
inquiry, has thus far elected not to rely on the representations of Mr. Benjamin.").)
Beyond recognizing that Mr. Benjamin has an ongoing contractual relationship with the
SAPD, the district court never provided any explanation as to why Mr. Benjamin's evaluation
should not be considered sufficiently independent and reliable. By appointing Mr. Roark, the
trial court interfered with an ordinary function that is carried out daily by the SAPD pursuant to
its statutory obligation, and simply replaced its judgment for that of the SAPD. To allow a
district court to substitute its own counsel, after work has already performed, would invite the
interference of any judge where conflict counsel is contracted either at trial or on appeal to act in
the stead of the corresponding public defender office.
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Idaho law requires the SAPD to provide Mr. Hall with capital post-conviction
representation.

In its attempt to ethically satisfy its statutory obligation, the SAPD adopted

reasonable procedures to ensure Mr. lfall had conflict-free representation. Mr. Benjamin has
already provided Mr. Hall with an impartial and independent evaluation of any possible conflict
with the SAPD, and neither the district court nor the State has been able to show why
Mr. Benjamin's work as conflict counsel should not be relied upon or how the SAPD's continued
representation of Mr. Hall is compromised. Consequently, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this
Court vacate the district court's order appointing Keith Roark. In the alternative, Mr. Hall asks
this Court vacate the order requiring the SAPD pay for a second conflict evaluation. To require
the SAPD to pay for Mr. Roark's services, where another attorney has already represented that
no conflict exists, and where Mr. Hall has already been given advice of counsel on the issue,
represents a forced payment for a duplication of services already provided that is unprecedented,
unnecessary and extraordinarily wasteful.
III.

The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of Confidential And Attorney-Client
Privileged Inforrn<ttion In Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict Inquiry
A.

Introduction
An attorney-client privilege existed once the SAPD was appointed as appellate and post-

conviction counsel to Mr. Hall in January of 2005, regardless of whether a separate criminal trial
was still pending. Consequently, the district court should recognize the privileges and rules
protecting confidential information apply to the SAPD files, irrespective of whether those files
contain information about Mr. Hall's then-pending trial. A subsequent wholesale waiver of the
privilege with respect to the trial attorneys on Hall II cannot constitute a waiver of the privilege
25

and rule of confidentiality, as it concerns Mr. Hall's current appellate and post-conviction
attorneys. The district court's orders declaring the attorney-client privilege waived and requiring
involuntary disclosure are excessive and unnecessary.
Although Idaho courts do not appear to have announced a clear standard of review in
cases involving the attorney-client privilege, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has: "whether
statements are protected by an individual attorney-client privilege is a mixed question of law and
fact which this court reviews independently and without deference to the district court." United
States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d
1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotes omitted)). That same court reviewed "de novo the
district court's ruling on the scope of the attorney-client privilege." Id.
B.

The District Court's Order Exceeded Its Authority, Impermissibly Compromises
Attorney-Client Confidentiality, Interferes With The Attorney-Client Relationship, and
Serves No Legitimate Purpose
1.

Existence Of An Attorney-Client Relationship

It is undisputed the SAPD has had a continuous, uninterrupted attorney-client relationship
with Mr. Hall since its appointment as post-conviction counsel in Hall I on January 25, 2005.
All contacts with Mr. Hall by attorneys or staff from the SAPD and all work generated by them,
are covered by the attorney-client privilege, work product rule, and rules of attorney-client
confidentiality. That attorney-client relationship exists for the current staff at the SAPD and also
extends to those attorneys no longer working for the SAPD. See IRPC 1.6,

Comment~

19 ("The

duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."); IRPC 1.9,
Comment~

1 ("After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing

duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest"). Once the SAPD was appointed
in January of 2005, all subsequent communications and file contents, regardless of their nature,
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fall under the mandates of the IRPC which generally prevent disclosure. 9 As a result, the SAPD
initially opposed the State's motion for disclosure of client file information or contacts with their
client or his other attorneys during their representation. (R.38528/38704, p.1297.) The existence
of the attorney-client relationship dictates the existence of the protections attached to the rules of
privilege and work-product, along with the rule of confidentiality.
2. Court's Conflation Of Attorney-Client Privilege And Rule Of Confidentiality
The district court's Order repeatedly refers to the "privilege" that exists in this case. (See
R.38528/38704, p.1375 ("the Court does not wish to expose itself to privileged information
concerning Hall I"); R.38528/38704, p.13 76 ("keeping in mind the attorney-client privilege
issues involved in any intertwining of the Hall I and Hall cases" and "attorney-client privilege
issues implicated by the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall on the Hall I post-conviction and
appeal.").) However, the Order ignores the distinctions between the attorney-client privilege,
rule of confidentiality, and the work-product doctrine. 10
The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule, and a privilege that may be invoked
by a client, or his attorney, to bar an attorney from testifying or disclosing confidential
9

The attorney-client privilege may be the oldest recognized privilege in the Common Law, and
has been recognized at least since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. See, e.g., Hartford v. Lee, 21
Eng. Rep. 34 (Ch. 177). And, as Wigmore notes, the privilege was virtually "unquestioned"
even then. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2990, at 547 (3d ed. 1940). The attorney-client privilege
encourages "'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.'"
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). "The privilege encourages clients to make full disclosure to
their lawyers," and "a 'fully informed lawyer can more effectively serve his client."' Reed v.
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). It is not hyperbole to suggest that
the attorney-client privilege is a necessary foundation for the adversarial system of justice. In re
Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2005).
10
Mr. Hall's attorneys at the SAPD have invoked the protections under the attorney-client
privilege, work product rule, and rules of attorney-client confidentiality since its first filings
opposing the State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict Hall II.
(See
R.38528/38704, p.1304.)
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communications.

The attorney-client privilege allows a client "to refuse to disclose and to

prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications" which were made (1)
between the client and his lawyers, (2) between the client's lav.ryers and that lawyer's agents, (3)
among several clients and their lawyers, as long as it concerns a matter of common interest, (4)
between other representatives of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives

representing the same client. See I.R.E. 502(b). Communications subject to the privilege are
limited to those which are confidential and "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication."
I.R.E. 502(a)(5).
In contrast, the IRPC guide lawyers' professional responsibilities.

The lRPC and

comments were specifically adopted by the Idaho Supreme Comi in 2004, and "are based largely
on the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, with some Idaho
variations."

See IRPC Title Heading.

Rule 1.6 of the IRPC governs confidentiality of

information, which is broader than the attorney-client privilege and includes "information
relating to the representation of a client." IRPC 1.6(a).
The IRPC makes a clear distinction between the attorney-client privilege and the rule of
confidentiality. Although they are "related bodies of law" the "attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as
a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client." IRPC 1.6,

Comment~

3. The "rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence
is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law." Id
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The commentary to the rule of

confidentiality provides "a lav.)'er may not disclose such information except as authorized or
required" by the IRPC or other law. Id.
Because the IRPC, as adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2004, are "based largely on
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct", consideration of relevant
Model Rules is appropriate. With respect to Rule 1.6, the Annotated Model Rules explain the
origin of the rule of confidentiality and the difference between it and the attorney-client
privilege:
The evidentiary attorney-client privilege is closely related to the ethical
duty of confidentiality. They are so closely related that the terms "privileged" and
"confidential" are often used interchangeably. But the two are entirely separate
concepts, applicable under different sets of circumstances. The ethical duty, on
the one hand, is extremely broad: it protects from disclosure all "information
relating to the representation of a client," and applies at all times. The attorneyclient privilege, on the other hand, is more limited: it protects from disclosure the
substance of a lawyer-client communication made for the purpose of obtaining or
imparting legal advice or assistance, and applies only in the context of a legal
proceeding. [Citations omitted.]
Accordingly, a court's determination that particular infom1ation is not
privileged is not the same as a determination that a lawyer has no ethical
obligation to protect the information from disclosure in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Ex Parte Taylor Coal Co. Inc., 401 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981) (fact that infomrntion not
covered by attorney-client privilege does not mean lawyer permitted to reveal
client's secrets, even after disclosure in court; under Model Code); see also
Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 603 n.2 (Utah 2003) (ethical duty of
confidentiality not coextensive with attorney-client privilege: "privilege might be
waived allowing compelled disclosure by an attorney while the duty of
confidentiality is still in full force").
ABA Model Rules of Profossional Conduct, Rule 1.6, Annotation, pp.93-94 (2007). While the
district court's orders address the waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the Rules of
Evidence, that waiver only obliquely addresses counsels' professional or ethical duties or
. .
11
o bl igat1ons.

11

The Supplemental Order does explicitly refer to IRPC 1.6(b)(6), when referring to the
clarification that the SAPD has been ordered to release its files. Such an order only underscores
29

3. Scope Of Privilege, Confidentiality And The Protections Thev Afford
According to the IRPC, "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client gives infom1ed consent" IRPC 1.6(a)(emphasis added). Elsewhere,

the rules state that "a lav.yer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of
a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted." IRPC Preamble

added).

ii 4 (emphasis

The IRPC clearly refer not to the representation of a certain case, but to the

representation of a client. In contrast, the district court's order draws the conclusion that the
attorney-client privilege only attaches when the material or communications involve a specific
case-in this case Hall I. 12

The Order appears to recognize an attorney-case privilege as

opposed to an attorney-client privilege.
In its Order, the district court found that "communications between the SAPD and trial

counsel about [Hall II] are not privileged because the SAPD had not yet been appointed to this
case when the communications occurred." (R.38528/38704, p.1375 (emphasis added).)

However, the court did not find there was no attorney-client relationship between the SAPD and

Mr. Hall-only that there was no privilege as it related to information on Hall II. Id at 1375-76.
This idea seems to have originated in the State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict
(Hall II). There, the State requested the SAPD disclose "any correspondence, notes, documents
and conversation members of the SAPD staff had with Erick Hall and/or trial counsel for Erick
Hall prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on January 4, 2008," arguing those

the confusion as to whether the court is referring to the privilege or the rule of confidentiality.
(See R.38528/38704, pp.1969-70.)
12
See R.38528/38704, p.1375 ("[t]he SAPD did represent the Petitioner on the Hall I postconviction case during the time frame in which these communications occurred and the court is
unaware of the extent to which the contact between the SAPD and trial counsel for Hall II
intermingled discussion about Hall I and Hall II, and the court does not wish to expose itself to
privileged information concerning Hall I."). The order expresses no similar concern for
privileged information concerning Hall II.
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disclosures "would not be protected by the Attorney-Client privilege because the SAPD did not
represent the Petitioner on Hall II during those time frames." (R.38528/38704, p.1289 (emphasis
in original).) However, the SAPD did represent Mr. }fall for approximately three years prior to
January of 2008.
After acknowledging that the privilege attaches to some of the SAPD files, the court
nevertheless appointed Mr. Roark and ordered him "to conduct a thorough and searching review
of the SAPD's pre-triaL trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to its
appointment" in Hall IL (R.38528/38704, pp.1375-76.) The court further authorized depositions
of Mr. Hall's current counsel, the SAPD, and Dennis Benjamin, who had represented Mr. Hall
for the limited purpose of evaluating and advising on any possible conflict. (R.38528/38704,
p.1376.)
To release the SAPD's entire file to anyone, even where that person is another attorney
selected by the court would be a clear breach of the attorney-client privilege.

The court's

Supplemental Order does not limit Mr. Roark's authorization to view or access the SAPD files in
any way. (R.38528/38704, pp.1969-70.) Those files would include all client communications,
notes, communications with others involved in the case, work-product, memoranda, and
investigative materials. The district court has also ordered the SAPD to cooperate if questioned
by Mr. Roark, "subject to a court order." (R.38528/38704, p.1970.)
4. Mr. Hall's Limit{'.d Waiver Of Confidentiality And f\lternate Avenues For The
District Court To Pursue Additional Infommtion
Mr. Hall has not granted informed consent to the SAPD to share his files with anyone
other than Mr. Benjamin for the purpose of conducting an investigation into a possible conflict.
(R.38528/38704, p.1460.) The IRPC make it clear that in the absence of the client's informed
consent, a lawyer is only permitted to reveal information relating to representation in very
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limited circumstances. The applicable exception in the instant case is "to comply with other law
or a court order." IRPC 1.6(b)(c). (See R.38528/38704, p.1970.)
It is entirely unnecessary to waive Mr. Hall's privilege and confidentiality with the SAPD
or Mr. Benjamin, and order the complete disclosure of files, in order to discover the nature of
conversations between the SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, where the district court has already
waived the attorney-client privilege regarding Mr. Chastain and Mr. Kristal. (See Order
Regarding Respondent's Motions for Discovery and For Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege,
R.38528/38704, pp.1250-51.) Nothing would prevent the district court from simply inquiring of
trial counsel as to the nature of those conversations, and any advice they received from the
SAPD attorneys. Instead, the district court's actions in this case suggest that its ultimate desire is
for the SAPD's client files be laid bare and for the SAPD to disclose client file information.
The district court, in its Order, found that the SAPD's Amended Notice of Possible
Conflict of Interest only provided the court with details about the methods by which the contact
occurred, and "did not provide any information about the substance of the conversations or
disclose whether the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel, despite this Court's specific request."
(R.38528/38704, p.1370.) The district court recognizes the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed
the same day as the Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, did include a disclosure
that one of the SAPD attorneys had given advice to trial counsel, but did not "give any
information about the substance or subject of that advice." Id. If the district court were simply
concerned with finding out what was said between the SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, the
district court could further inquire of Mr. Benjamin to determine whether he was willing to share
the nature of those contacts, or inquire directly of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, for whom
privilege has already been waived. .
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5.

Uncertain Nature Of Mr. Roark's Contemplated Representation And Inquiry

The district court's order makes little mention of the implications that the presumed
attorney-client privilege and rule of confidentiality between Mr. Hall and Mr. Roark may have
on Mr. Roark' s ability to satisfy the court's request. 13

If, in fact, Mr. Roark is an attorney

appointed to represent Mr. Hall, and not an independent investigator of the district court, it is
unclear why Mr. Roark would be permitted by the rules of evidence and rules of professional
conduct to reveal any more information than the SAPD or Mr. Benjamin have been willing to
reveal. The uncertainty of Mr. Roark's relationship to Mr. Hall is compounded by the fact that
whereas the district court would require Mr. Roark to "advise the Petitioner" on the waiver issue
if the court were to find a conflict, but it is silent as to whether Mr. Roark should consult with
Mr. Hall during his evaluation of the conflict. (R.38528/38704, p.1376.)
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
considered the extent to which appointed counsel is required to make disclosures to the Court
regarding the basis for a conflict of interest.

In Holloway, counsel had been appointed to

represent three co-defendants at a joint trial.

Counsel for the defendant had made motions

requesting separate counsel be appointed because of conflicts of strategy and defense that had
arisen after counseling with his three clients individually. Id at 477. The Supreme Court held
that a failure to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate precautions deprived the defendant
of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 484.

13

The district court notes that "Mr. Roark shall present his findings to this Court, keeping in
mind the attorney-client privilege issues involved in any intertwining of the Hall I and Hall II
cases." (R.38528/38704, p.1376.) This suggests that Mr. Roark should only be concerned with
privilege issues as they relate to information regarding Hall I. But the order also allows
Mr. Roark to file a separate report under seal if he were to determine that details regarding the
"extent of the conflict and other issues" are not appropriate for the court's consumption. Id.
This would seem to suggest that the district court recognizes some modicum of confidentiality.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that in representing the basis for a motion requesting
separate counsel for a co-defendant "in more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk
of violating, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his clients." Id. at 485. However,
the Court noted that their holding did not "preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of
the basis of defense counsel's representation regarding a conflict of interest without improperly

requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the client." Id. at 487 (emphasis
added). In the instant case, the district court has alternative avenues of further inquiry without
violating the confidential material held by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin.
Once the attorney-client privilege or rule of confidentiality is waived, it is waived forever
and the protection cannot be restored. See Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir.
1997) ("once putatively protected material is disclosed, the very 'right sought to be protected'
has been destroyed", and "there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure"
(citations omitted)). It is a classic case of never being able to unring a bell. If Mr. Roark is
granted unfettered access to the SAPD's protected files and communications, and subsequently
reports the contents of those files to the district court as suggested by its orders, without any
assurances that attorney-client privilege and rules of confidentiality will also apply to
Mr. Roark's investigation, irreparable harm may be done to Mr. Hall.

Of course, if those

protections do apply to Mr. Roark's evaluation, it only begs the question as to what the
difference in posture would be between Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Roark. In that instance, the only
difference is whether the attorney evaluating the conflict was of the district court's own
choosing. If the information in possession of the court is inadequate, the district court should
then make further inquiries of Mr. Benjamin as the attorney representing Mr. Hall on the limited
issue of the conflict evaluation.
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C.

Conclusion
Because an attorney-client relationship has existed between Mr. Hall and the SAPD since

early 2005, this Court should find that both the attorney-client privilege and rule of
confidentiality apply to the entire contents of the SAPD's file, irrespective of whether the district
court has already waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to Mr. Chastain and
Ms. Kristal.

Mr. Hall requests this Court find that in light of Mr. Benjamin's affidavit, the

attorney-client privilege and rule of confidentiality serve to protect further disclosure of
protected materials to additional attorneys appointed by the court; and that an order requiring the
SAPD to release those files and answer questions serves little purpose where the district court
has neither exhausted Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal---who are no longer bound by the attorneyclient privilege--or Mr. Benjamin.

CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Benjamin has already performed the conflict evaluation sought by the
district court, its orders appointing Mr. Roark are duplicative and unnecessary.

Even if

Mr. Roark were to satisfy the district court's order, the district court would be in no better
position to evaluate the presence of an actual conflict than it would be upon further inquiry of
Mr. Benjamin. In addition, it is a violation of the separation of powers for the district court to
insert itself into the management and budget of an executive agency like the SAPD, where every
indication is that the agency has satisfied both its statutory mandate and its ethical obligation to
its client. Furthermore, the documents ordered to be released are protected by attorney-client
privilege and the rule of confidentiality. For these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully asks this Court
to vacate the district court's orders appointing Mr. Roark to conduct a second conflict inquiry
and return this case for completion of post-conviction proceedings.
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